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Abstract
The Internet today is a highly dynamic environment which frequently requires secure communication be-
tween peers that do not have a direct trust relationship. Current solutions for establishing trust often
require static and application-speciﬁc Public Key Infrastructures (PKIs). This paper presents trusted di-
rectory services as a key infrastructural technology for setting up secure Internet connections, providing an
alternative to application-speciﬁc PKIs. The directory securely binds public keys to peers through their
names in a ﬂexible way that matches the dynamic nature of the Internet. We elaborate on this concept by
showing how the Domain Name System (DNS) and its security extensions (DNSSEC) can be leveraged for
establishing secure Transport Layer Security (TLS) connections in a dynamic way. A simple enhancement
of the TLS protocol, called Extended TLS (E-TLS), required for this purpose, is proposed. We describe
our E-TLS implementation and we conclude with an evaluation of our results.
Keywords: Public Key Infrastructures, secure DNS, Transport Layer Security, trusted directory services.
1 Introduction
During the second half of the previous century the number of sensitive business
communications and ﬁnancial transactions increased rapidly. These communica-
tions often involved parties from diﬀerent organizations that had not communicated
previously nor had the chance to exchange shared keys for symmetric encryption.
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In 1976 Diﬃe, Hellman and Merkle presented Public Key Cryptography (PKC) [1]
as a solution for securing communications between two parties that did not have
the chance to exchange shared encryption keys beforehand. A crucial requirement
for PKC to work, not properly addressed at the time of invention, is that public
keys must be associated with their users in a trusted (i.e. authenticated) man-
ner, for instance by a trusted third-party (e.g. in the form of signed certiﬁcates)
or in some kind of trusted directory. An infrastructural technology that addresses
binding public keys to parties and the distribution of those keys is generally called
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). Although PKC is widely recognized and adopted
as key technology for secure communications on the Internet, the key distribution
and binding issue described above and other drawbacks, such as summarized in [2],
have limited the success of many application or domain-speciﬁc PKIs.
This paper proposes an alternative approach for public key binding and dis-
tribution by leveraging the existing Internet Domain Name System (DNS) and its
security extensions (DNSSEC) for creating an infrastructural solution for dynamic
trust establishment. Our proposal is not tied to a speciﬁc application but can be
reused across a variety of applications. It allows for establishment of secure commu-
nication channels between peers that have no prior relationship and thus accommo-
dates for the distributed nature of trust management on the Internet. The research
questions that our approach addresses can be summarized as: how to address the
major shortcomings of traditional PKC/PKIs that use Certiﬁcate Authorities and
statically conﬁgured root certiﬁcates, how to support dynamic secure connection
setup between peers that do not have a prior relationship, using a trusted directory
service, and how to leverage generic and/or existing Internet infrastructural services
to implement a directory service that securely binds public keys to parties and that
can be used for the distribution of those keys.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents an
overview of related work in this area. Section 3 elaborates on the concept of using
trusted directories in secure communications and section 4 describes the application
of this concept using DNSSEC for establishing TLS connections. Section 5 describes
our prototype implementation, followed by an evaluation of our approach in section
6. Finally we present our conclusions in section 7.
2 Related Work
Although much related work exists on key authentication and distribution issues,
we focus here on approaches that apply directory services to address the problem.
The ISO X.500 recommendation [3] was to be a global, distributed database of
named entities also known as a global on-line telephone book or directory service.
The ISO X.509 recommendation [4] was published as part of X.500, deﬁning X.509
certiﬁcates that were used to bind public keys to X.500 path names (called Distin-
guished Names). The X.500 approach requires a single, global naming discipline
and as of today there are too many legacy naming systems in use that can not
be simply replaced or united in a single discipline. Therefore the X.500 idea of a
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single, globally unique name that everyone could use when referring to an entity, is
not likely to occur. One notable exception to this rule is the DNS [5] for naming
Internet resources as we will focus on in this paper. The X.509 certiﬁcates however
have become a commodity on the Internet today, binding public keys to names.
Jones et al. proposed the Internet Key Service (IKS), which is a distributed
architecture for authenticated distribution of public keys, layered on DNSSEC [6].
Clients use DNSSEC to securely discover the identities of the relevant IKS servers,
and send key lookup or management requests directly to these servers using a
special-purpose protocol. We believe that the suitability and scalability of the DNS
itself does not justify the development of a new protocol and system. Moreover
our approach also addresses the operational aspects of the system through actual
applications rather than focusing on the system itself.
IPsec can use opportunistic encryption and rely on DNSSEC as a keying mech-
anism within the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) protocol [7]. The objective of op-
portunistic encryption is to allow encryption without having any pre-arrangements
in place that are speciﬁc to the systems involved. Each system administrator adds
public key information to DNS records to support opportunistic encryption and
then enables this feature in the nodes’ IPsec stack. Once this is done, any two such
nodes can communicate securely by retrieving a KEY Resource Record (RR) from
DNSSEC to be used for communicating with the host or identity associated with
the name. This is similar to the solution that we propose in this paper, but we use
DNSSEC for building opportunistic TLS channels.
Le and Guyennet propose a solution to grid applications’ speciﬁc needs in data
transport security in [8]. To address the key management part, the solution secures
the local DNS server with the DNSSEC extensions, making it become a local certi-
ﬁcation authority. This design choice solves a dual problem: secret key distribution
and scalability of the solution. The authors have strictly focused on setting up SSH
sessions. They have developed an implementation of their proposal by modifying an
SSH client. There are no formal speciﬁcation of the protocol or architecture and no
evaluation against other approaches. Thus the results cannot be generalized easily.
Schlyter et al. describe the use of the DNS as a certiﬁcate store and its im-
plication for path validation in an X.509 PKI [9]. This proposal resembles the
approach followed in this paper with the exception that DNS is used without the
DNSSEC extensions. Therefore the resolved certiﬁcate must be checked against a
local certiﬁcate store instead of relying on a shared trusted infrastructure provided
by DNSSEC. In [10] Schlyter and Griﬃn present a proposal for securing SSH by
using DNS lookups. As described in the previous paragraph, the main diﬀerence
with our approach is that trust is veriﬁed explicitly on-request by the user instead
of relying on a mandatory trusted DNSSEC infrastructure. Moreover this approach
concentrates on the SSH application only. In [11] Josefsson describes how to use the
DNS as a certiﬁcate directory. This approach resembles the one we follow in this
paper but oﬀers a less generic perspective. Its focus is on the machinery of storing
and resolving certiﬁcates and how to use those certiﬁcates for electronic messaging.
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3 Authenticated Public Key Directories
Binding authentication to the keying material is crucial to avoid MITM attacks.
Providing this binding is not straightforward: the use of public keys only proves
ownership of the key pair, not who really owns the keys. Usually a Trusted Third
Party (TTP) somehow ensures the binding between the peers and their keys.
3.1 Public Key Authentication and Distribution
Public key authentication is the process of validating the binding of a public key
to a named entity. The most widely used approaches for public key authentication
are the certifying authority model using certiﬁcates, e.g., SSL/TLS [12], and the
web-of-trust model, e.g., Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) [13]. Methods for obtaining
a public key can generally be classiﬁed in between two following options:
1) Through an untrusted channel: The receiver’s public key could be sent to the
sender over an arbitrary, insecure channel. Since the message containing the re-
cipient’s public key in itself cannot be trusted because it was sent by an untrusted
party, additional signing of this message by a TTP is required to authenticate the
key. Veriﬁcation of the signature on this message requires local availability of the
signer’s public key at the sender side. The X.509 certiﬁcates are commonly used for
securing Internet communications today, e.g. in IPsec, SSL and TLS [12].
2) Through a trusted channel: Perhaps the most natural way to obtain the public
key of an initially unknown party is by consulting a TTP through a trusted channel.
The trust relation with the TTP and the assumption that the communication with
the TTP is secure, guarantee the integrity of the public key and in fact establish
the authentication of the unknown party. Since a TTP can probably guarantee
only a small number of public keys, it would be more convenient to use a shared
public trusted channel that manages and provides public keys for a potentially
large number of parties. Examples of such a public channel, with a rather static
nature, are phonebooks and newspapers publicizing keying information, but online
directories (thus trusted directory services) are a more dynamic alternative.
3.2 Naming
The index in the public directory that points to the entry holding the public key
is formed by a unique name. A party must be identiﬁed using a name that is
valid and unique in a name space that is shared between the public key owner
and the public key requestor. Certiﬁcate identiﬁers often consist of person and
company names as used in everyday, called ”Common Names” in X.509 terminology.
These are typically not good identiﬁers since they are not part of a well deﬁned
naming space. As such they cannot be guaranteed to be unique, at least not over
diﬀerent Certiﬁcate Authorities [2]. The Internet has named the whole world with
domain names, e-mail names and URLs. These names are unique by assignment
because of a hierarchy of naming authorities with a single root. Although the X.500
naming scheme is in use for the most widespread type (X.509) of certiﬁcates used
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on the Internet today, we suggest using the DNS system and its associated naming
hierarchy for resolving X.509 certiﬁcates when for securing Internet connectivity.
3.3 Towards a Trusted Directory Service Solution
While several solutions to the aforementioned problems can be devised, this paper
proposes a trusted online directory approach for public key and certiﬁcate lookups.
This approach conveniently solves the public key distribution and identiﬁcation
issues needed for peer authentication in PKC. Moreover, some of the major problems
found in current PKI deployment are related to static conﬁguration, complexity and
administrative overhead (see [2] for a survey). The use of online trusted directories
addresses some of these problems by providing:
• Ease of public key revocation: this is achieved by simply deleting the revoked
keys from the directory.
• Extensibility: any party that thinks a particular certiﬁcate can be trusted can
place it easily in the directory, and this propagates the trust to its users.
• Single point of entrance: the problems with trying to handle multiple root CAs
and understanding interacting policies and trust are avoided.
• Simplicity: there is less demand on the use of complex CA software since self-
signed certiﬁcates can be used. This leads to lower deployment cost.
The approach we pursue is to use DNS and its secure extensions, called DNSSEC
[14], for implementing public key and certiﬁcate directories. We expect that
DNSSEC key/certiﬁcate repositories will be formed around so-called virtual or-
ganizations (VOs); organizations or communities that have a shared interest in
exchanging credentials within the scope of that VO (see also [15]). This resembles
the VO concept in the grid computing [16].
4 DNSSEC and TLS
This section elaborates on the features of DNSSEC and how we use it to create a
trusted directory service and to apply it to TLS connectivity.
4.1 DNS and DNSSEC
DNS [5] is an Internet directory service. It is a well known, globally distributed,
redundant and highly available database. Its main use is associating domain names
(such as ”www.example.com”) with Internet protocol addresses. DNS is distributed
hierarchically, where the structure of the hierarchy is embedded in the domain name.
Many types of data are stored in the DNS, ranging from address (denoted by type
A) and text records (type TXT) to certiﬁcate records (type CERT). This data can
be resolved through its associated name which functions as an index in the DNS
directory. The DNS protocol suﬀers from several distinct classes of threats [17].
As a protection against these threats, the DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) [14]
were conceived. DNSSEC is a seamless addition to DNS, where trust relations are
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organized using the same DNS hierarchy. A DNS resolver, conﬁgured with a trust
anchor for part of the hierarchy, is able to authenticate data in the hierarchy.
4.2 DNSSEC as a Trusted Directory Service
Although X.509 certiﬁcate features allow for federation and syndication (for a de-
scription see hereafter), it is fairly cumbersome and has its drawbacks [2]. DNS
supports the storage of X.509 certiﬁcates in the DNS in the form of CERT records.
The DNS protocol already allows for syndication, while federation can be emulated
trivially. DNSSEC can thus be used to supply a layer of trust and it can be used
to implement a PKI.
1) Syndication: Through so-called X.509 certiﬁcate chaining, a root certiﬁcate is
able to sign a certiﬁcate request that in itself is capable of signing new certiﬁcates.
In this way, an organization can syndicate trust to third parties. With DNS, syndi-
cation happens by merely delegating an administrative domain to others, e.g., the
organization that controls ”.com” has delegated the domain ”example.com” to the
Example company. With DNSSEC, third parties are able to validate this delegation.
2) Federation: An X.509 root certiﬁcate is able to sign multiple certiﬁcates. With
DNS, an administrative domain, such as ”example.com” can administer the feder-
ated organization under, for instance, ”federation.example.com”, which holds all the
information about the federation. With DNSSEC, third parties are able to validate
this administrative domain, for an example see [18].
3) Trusted directory based PKI: Using DNS and DNSSEC for federation and syn-
dication through hierarchical naming, it is straightforward to create a PKI. Self-
signed certiﬁcates allow for a low-cost infrastructure, while access to the DNS is
already present in the Internet conﬁguration of the participating parties. DNSSEC
replaces the trust infrastructure that certiﬁcate chaining provides. Moreover, the
conﬁguration of an administrative domain in DNSSEC allows for a wider range of
authenticated information than X.509 can currently provide.
4) Certiﬁcate revocation: Common PKI certiﬁcate policies require that whenever
one wants to use a certiﬁcate, its validity must be checked beforehand. When omit-
ting to do so, a revoked certiﬁcate may be incorrectly accepted as valid. This means
that to eﬀectively use a PKI one must have consulted a so-called Certiﬁcate Revo-
cation List (CRL), in which certiﬁcate authorities indicate which certiﬁcates have
been revoked. By using a trusted directory to resolve certiﬁcates, the certiﬁcate
revocation problem has become almost trivial. Whenever a certiﬁcate is revoked
before its expiry date, its entry is simply removed from the trusted directory. Note
that usually DNS entries are cached by various servers to reduce traﬃc. The cer-
tiﬁcate revocation process, therefore, is limited by the frequency of DNS cache
updates (max one day). A VO policy could deem this suﬃcient. If more frequent
cert revocation is required, standard CRL checking would be needed in the cache.
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4.3 Transport Layer Security Protocol
TLS provides endpoint authentication and communication privacy over the Internet
using cryptography based on keying material obtained from certiﬁcates [12]. Typ-
ically, only the server is authenticated, while the client remains unauthenticated,
although client authentication through a client certiﬁcate can be requested as well.
Although the certiﬁcates resolved from a trusted DNSSEC directory can be applied
for multiple purposes we focus here on using the certiﬁcates for setting up TLS
connections. Since TLS is so widely used on the Internet today, it would beneﬁt the
most from improvements in the PKI infrastructure such as the one that we propose.
There are two ways for applying resolved certiﬁcates to TLS connections:
1) Server authentication: the client connects to a server by using a hostname that
is a valid entry in the DNS for which a certiﬁcate can be resolved. The server itself
also presents a server certiﬁcate as part of the TLS setup, and this certiﬁcate is
checked against the one that is resolved from the DNSSEC trusted directory.
2) Client authentication: the client presents a client certiﬁcate to the server as part
of the TLS client authentication. The server checks the client certiﬁcate against the
one resolved from the DNSSEC trusted directory for that client.
In the latter case, the server needs to obtain an identiﬁer (or: peer name) to use
as an index in the DNSSEC directory service. One option is to use reverse DNS
lookup to resolve the client’s IP address to a hostname that can be used as a peer
name. The downside of this approach is that clients are always associated with a
speciﬁc hostname which does not work well if the client is located behind a Network
Address Translation (NAT) gateway or when the client is a mobile host located in a
visited network. We suggest a more ﬂexible and generic approach in which the client
sends a client identiﬁer to the server in the client authentication phase, together
with the client certiﬁcate. To realize this, we extend the TLS connection setup phase
with an extra feature that allows the client to present its name in a standardized
way to the server, independent of the IP-address of the client (ﬁxed or mobile).
We distinguish two methods to do so, both compliant with the speciﬁcation for
extensions of TLS protocol [19].
1) TLS name indication: a TLS extension called TLS Client Name Indication could
be standardized. The client name is binding a DNS resolvable name to a certiﬁcate
regarding the IP-address.
2) Client certiﬁcate URL: an alternative solution is to use the existing TLS extension
for specifying so-called Client Certiﬁcate URLs. This feature exists in TLS because
it may be desirable for constrained clients to send certiﬁcate URLs in place of
certiﬁcates, so that they do not need to store their certiﬁcates and can therefore
save memory. Complying to [20], we deﬁned a ”dns://<Client name>” URL type
indicating that certiﬁcates should be resolved from DNS. As a disadvantage, existing
TLS implementations may not support this non-standard URL type.
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5 Implementation
This section describes a draft software implementation of the proposal presented
in this paper. Our implementation is realized as a custom extension on top of
a standard TLS protocol implementation, with client and server authentication
through certiﬁcates retrieved from a trusted DNS directory. This customized TLS
protocol is referred to as Enhanced TLS (E-TLS). We show an overview of the
protocol steps involved when peer A initiates a connection with peer B in the context
of a VO named NVO. This VO runs trusted directory services through DNSSEC, in
which member names are associated with their certiﬁcates containing member public
keys. For example, the name NA for peer A, and NB for peer B are associated with
their respective certiﬁcates CA and CB. Notice that A knows B’s name NB (and
thereby B’s IP address through some other means like DNS). The steps required
for setting up an E-TLS connection between A and B are (see Fig. 1):
1) A uses name NB to retrieve B’s certiﬁcate CB from the trusted directory in the
context of the communication, being the virtual organization VO. In our case this
means that A preﬁxes the name NVO with name NB and resolves this composed
name via DNSSEC to certiﬁcate CB by retrieval of a DNS CERT record.
2) A uses its own certiﬁcate CA as a client certiﬁcate to setup a client-authenticated
TLS connection to B’s IP address in which B presents its server certiﬁcate CB to
A as part of the server authentication.
3) A veriﬁes the certiﬁcate that B presented as part of the TLS server authentication
against the certiﬁcate resolved in step 1.
4) B accepts the incoming client-authenticated TLS connection initially without
verifying it i.e. accepting the presented client certiﬁcate by default.
5) A sends his name NA to B over the TLS connection, realized by sending a string
NA followed by a carriage-return character.
6) B receives A’s name and uses that to retrieve A’s certiﬁcate CA from the trusted
directory; similar to what A did for B’s certiﬁcate CB in step 1.
7) B checks the certiﬁcate that A initially presented in the TLS connection setup in
step 2/3 and compares this to the certiﬁcate retrieved in the previous step.
8) If the certiﬁcates match, B sends the string ”OK” followed by a carriage return to
A and ”user-space” communication can start over the established TLS connection,
if not B terminates the connection by closing the socket.
Additionally we created a so-called Resolver API which abstracts from the un-
derlying resolver implementation that actually resolves names to certiﬁcates. Be-
cause of this abstraction we are able to support alternative implementations possibly
binding to trusted directory services other than DNSSEC. For our purposes we de-
veloped two implementations of this API which we can use inter-changeably: DNS
Resolver and File Resolver. The DNS Resolver API is the main resolver used for
validating the E-TLS protocol, resolving certiﬁcates from DNSSEC as proposed in
this paper. The File Resolver implementation resolves certiﬁcates through the use
J.F. Zandbelt et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 197 (2008) 91–10398
Fig. 1. E-TLS connection setup protocol steps.
of ﬂat ﬁles, mainly useful for testing purposes and performance comparisons.
We denote the exchange of A’s name and the response from B by the term
handshake, formed by the extra bit of communication after establishing a legacy
connection, needed to ﬁnish the E-TLS part. To support this in a generic way
we designed a so-called Handshake API, allowing for applying diﬀerent handshake
implementations. The behavior of the E-TLS implementation is fully conﬁgurable
through conﬁguration ﬁles, including the types of socket, resolver, and handshake.
We developed our prototype software in the Java programming language using
the Sun Java Development Kit version 1.5.0 (JDK 1.5) [21]. We used the DNSjava
[22] library version 2.0.3 for providing DNS and DNSSEC functionality, both at the
client and the server side, the latter meaning that we used the Java DNS server
that comes with the DNSjava package. The TLS implementation that we extended
on is included in the Java Secure Sockets Extension (JSSE) implementation that
comes with JDK 1.5 [23]. We developed Java classes for use at the client and
server side, supporting creation of E-TLS client and server socket objects which are
specializations of ”plain” TCP and SSL Java socket classes.
6 Evaluation
We evaluated our approach against alternative solutions, among which setting up
TLS connections using statically conﬁgured certiﬁcates.
6.1 Performance
We have compared the performance of E-TLS connection setup using our imple-
mentation against the setup of legacy TCP and TLS connections. We measured
by creating 1000 connections for each connection type and calculating the average.
The tests were performed on a host with a Pentium IV 3.4 GHz processor run-
ning Ubuntu Linux 6.10. We diﬀerentiated between setting up connections with
and without a handshake. Although in a deployment scenario it is unrealistic to
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Connection Type setup time without handshake setup time with handshake
TCP 1.30 ms 4.45 ms
TLS 46.88 ms 49.81 ms
E-TLS 90.71 ms 95.51 ms
E-TLS (ﬁle) - 91.63 ms
Table 1
performance comparison of connection setup time.
accept connections without performing the handshake (i.e. accepting a client certiﬁ-
cate without checking it), it is useful in tests and measurements. This is because it
shows the overhead due to the handshake itself, apart from the overhead of resolving
certiﬁcates. The results are shown below in Table 1. The last entry, E-TLS (ﬁle),
shows the results when resolving certiﬁcates from a local, cached ﬁle instead of re-
mote DNS. The table shows that the overhead of E-TLS compared to standard TLS
can be expressed in two components: the overhead of the handshake for sending the
client name the result and the overhead of resolving certiﬁcates at connection setup
at both endpoints (expressed in the diﬀerence between E-TLS and TLS). These
overheads are about 3.6 and 45 milliseconds per connection, respectively.
6.2 Administrative and Runtime Overheads
The administrative (oﬄine) overhead involved in deploying the proposal presented
in this paper concerns both DNSSEC deployment and the conﬁguration of a naming
space related to the certiﬁcates in a domain. For elaborations on generic DNSSEC
deployment, the reader is referred to [25]. Although not widely deployed yet, we
consider DNSSEC to be a necessary and thus future part of a common, shared
secure Internet infrastructure. When comparing the administrative overhead with
application speciﬁc PKI we see that the burden on the client in traditional PKI
solutions, where certiﬁcates are stored and managed at the client side, is shifted
to the owner/manager of the DNS domain that holds the certiﬁcate, and thus
becomes a centralized eﬀort. In our view this is an appropriate shift if only the
task is performed by a dedicated party, i.e., the VO.
The runtime (online) overhead associated with this proposal when setting up
TLS connections is considerable because of the encryption and veriﬁcation of
DNSSEC traﬃc, the DNSSEC operations needed for certiﬁcate retrieval at both
peer ends and the communication overhead of sending a DNS name to the remote
peer and a response back to the initiating peer. Although the overhead of E-TLS
over standard TLS is apparently large one must realize that the comparison is
slightly inappropriate. In the E-TLS case, certiﬁcate exchange is done real-time in
the actual connection setup phase, whereas in standard TLS most of that work has
been done oﬀ-line and the setup can be considered pre-conﬁgured. Caching of cer-
tiﬁcates in E-TLS would be a viable solution to overcome performance drawbacks
in particular cases and it would yield a better comparison against standard TLS.
Of course the cache would still have to respect any CRLs (see Subsection 4.2).
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6.3 PKI Management
Regarding our proposed solution one may conclude that the PKI key management
problem is now merely shifted to DNS providers and DNSSEC deployment and
conﬁguration. We believe, however, that the approach addresses the PKI problem
at an appropriate, shared infrastructural level. Moreover it involves fewer parties
and these parties are typically better suited towards management of infrastructural
assets such as keys and certiﬁcates. In the end this shift addresses the dynamic
requirement of trusted connection establishment as expressed in the objectives of
this paper. The mentioned characteristics imply also that this proposal is not
geared towards end-users: having to create and manage per-client certiﬁcates and
to maintain a domain entry in a DNS tree are likely to be too much to ask from
end-users; this has to be accomplished on a higher-than-individual, organizational
level. DNS data tends to change slowly and is controlled by domain administrators.
Allowing users some level of direct control over their keys would violate the existing
model. Supporting dynamic DNS update for DNSSEC is diﬃcult in general [26].
6.4 DNS Suitability
As stated in [27], DNS was designed to identify network resources. Inherent support
for resolving credentials is provided though the KEY and CERT records [28]. Using
DNS as a trusted directory service for application keys and certiﬁcates has been
proposed a number of times as shown in section 2. Still it is a controversial topic in
the DNS community as can be observed from multiple discussions on the Internet.
There are yet two concerns about DNSSEC:
1) Scalability: Proposals to house per-user information in DNS did not anticipate
that the growth in Internet user population would far surpass the growth in DNS-
registered host systems. Adding DNSSEC signature records to a zone increases the
size of the zone data by a factor of 8 or 9 [30], and adding per-user keys and their
signatures would further increase the size of the zone data. Moreover the appli-
cation of our approach would increase the average number of requests per second
on the DNS servers and resolvers. This load would have to be accommodated for
by applying scalability techniques such as server pool dimensioning, load balancing
and providing additional network bandwidth.
2) Performance: The DNS has been designed and optimized for very small message
exchanges, about 300 bytes in size. Returning key and certiﬁcate data (1.2 KB)
complemented by the associated signatures in DNS responses would signiﬁcantly
increase network load. Moreover the UDP maximum packet length may not be
appropriate for large certiﬁcates, in which case a fallback to TCP has to occur,
at the cost of more time and resources. However, storing and resolving full-blown
certiﬁcates from the DNS is a convenience solution in our proposal, useful to be
able to apply the resolved certiﬁcates directly to TLS connections. We take into
account that the use of CERT records could be replaced by using a newly deﬁned
application speciﬁc KEY RR containing only a public key, as proposed in [31].
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6.5 Security
Resolving and checking of certiﬁcates in our approach now depend on the availability
of the DNS service. As such the DNS service is a single point of attack and a single
point of failure. We feel however that these issues have to be addressed for DNS
services anyway, and can not be avoided for any shared trusted directory solution.
The presented E-TLS protocol is vulnerable to DoS attacks because the presented
certiﬁcates have to be processed. This vulnerability also exists for TLS [24].
7 Conclusions
We have presented an approach and an implementation for setting up secure (TLS)
connections using certiﬁcates resolved from a trusted directory service (DNSSEC).
Our proposal reuses existing Internet infrastructure that already operates in a hi-
erarchical global naming scheme. Application of credentials resolved through a
trusted directory service is not limited to a speciﬁc protocol (e.g. TLS) but can be
applied to any protocol that requires credentials obtained through a peer identiﬁer
mapping (e.g. IPsec and encrypted UDP traﬃc). We have shown how TLS can be
extended to use certiﬁcates resolved from a trusted directory, in this case DNSSEC.
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